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easily be made proportional to the fault. The felony murder rule may have out-
lived its usefulness, and because of the courts' reluctance to abandon such a well
established rule, the legislatures should consider abolition of the rule.
Robert W. Crabtree*
Member, Second Year Class.
MODIFICATION OF AN IMPRACTICABLE
CHARITABLE TRUST
Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons,' decided by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in August, 1964, has been earlier noted as announcing the
rule that a minority of the board of governors of a charitable corporation can bring
an action to enjoin a threatened breach of trust by the majority, and that the
attorney general does not have the exclusive power to enforce a charitable trust.
2
The action in Holt was brought to enjoin the majority trustees from a threat-
ened breach of the trust. Inasmuch as the complaint alleged that the majority
contemplated action which would change what was alleged to be the stated pur-
pose of the corporation and divert the substantial resources of the corporation to
purposes other than those for which it was organized, it was held to be sufficient.
Plaintiffs were required by the court to make a minor amendment,3 once this is
done, the matter will go to trial, and the circumstances surrounding the case give
rise to some interesting speculations as to the final result.
The Problem: Whither Osteopathy in California
It seems important to note that the College of Osteopathic Physicians & Sur-
geons (COPS) was established in 19144 and that early in 1961 the California
Medical Association and the California Osteopathic Association entered into an
agreement, the essence of which was the abolition of the distinctions between the
regular or allopathic study of medicine and the osteopathic discipline. 5 The forty-
seven years that intervened span a millenium in terms of the expansion of medical
science.
In May 1961 the majority of the board of COPS, seeking to implement this
161 Cal. 2d 750, 394 P.2d 932, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1964).
2 Note, 16 HAsTwrs L.J. 479 (1965).
3 Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 761, 394
P.2d 932, 939, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 251 (1964). The court affirmed the trial court's hold-
ing that the California Osteopathic Association was an indispensable party and gave
plaintiffs leave to amend to join the Association as a party defendant.
4 Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 758, 394
P.2d 932, 938, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 250 (1964).
5 Editorial, Time for Unification, California Medicine, July, 1962.
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agreement, resolved to change the name of -the College, eliminating the word
"osteopathic" therefrom, to use its best efforts to obtain the necessary accredita-
tion for approval as an allopathic medical school by making appropriate changes
in the curriculum, and to assist in -the removal of the distinction among persons
practicing medicine in the State of California holding an unlimited Physician and
Surgeon's certificate. This matter was all alleged at length in plaintiffs pleading,6
and it was action pursuant to this resolution that plaintiff sought to enjoin.
In the statewide election in California in November, 1962, the ballot contained
Proposition 22, which tacitly provided for the implementation of the agreement
between the California Osteopathic Association and the California Medical Asso-
ciation in that persons with a degree in osteopathy would be permitted to obtain
an M.D. certificate -by applying to the Board of Medical Examiners, passing the
requisite examination, and paying one-half the regular fee. Such persons were
then to abandon use of -the title D.O. Failure to do so would be deemed unpro-
fessional conduct. The legislature was to retain power to abolish the Board of
Osteopathic Examiners in the event that -the number of persons subject to its juris-
diction dwindled to forty or less. The voters of California passed Proposition 22,
evidencing wide public awareness and approval of the plan, and it was duly in-
corporated into the Business and Professional Code.7
It should be emphasized that Holt merely decided that the complaint was suf-
ficient to state a cause of action. It may be anticipated, however, that the facts
themselves will present some very practical problems. The Holt opinion goes to
considerable lengths in discussing the distinctions between the two schools of
medicine, vouchsafing that osteopathy is a growing profession in the United
States.8 But what if osteopathy is not a "growing profession"? What if, as appears
from the 1961 agreement between the two professional associations, from Propo-
sition 22 and its subsequent enactment into law, the study of osteopathy has
reached the end of the line, at least in California? This possibility brings into
sharp focus the questions of under what circumstances and to what extent devia-
tion from the original purpose of a charitable -trust may be permissible.
Two Approaches to a Solution
1. The Cy Pres Doctrine-An Actual Change in the Charitable Purpose
The court in Holt observed that it was not presented at that stage of the pro-
ceedings with -the applicability of the cy pres doctrine.9 It seems, however, that
if the case develops along the lines that the factual background outlined above
suggests, cy pres, or something like it, must at least be considered in disposing
of the matter.
The doctrine of cy pres ("as near as [possible]"),19 as it pertains -to American
law, permits a court to apply the assets of a charitable trust as nearly as possible
I Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 758-59,
394 P.2d 932, 938, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 250 (1964).
.CAL. Bus. & PaoF. CODE § 2396.5.
8 Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 758, 394
P.2d 932, 937-38, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 249-50 (1964).
9 Id. at 755 n.3, 394 P.2d at 936 n.3, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 248 n.3.
3 0 BLAcK, LAw DicrioNARY 464 (4th ed. 1951).
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to the trustor's original purpose where the particular purpose has become impos-
sible or impracticable of fulfillment.'1 The cy pres power is actually to change the
charitable purpose, to apply the trust property for a charitable purpose other than
that designated by the terms of the trust.'2 It is much more extensive than the
ordinary power of deviation from the method of administration of a trust, char-
itable or otherwise, exercisable by a court of equity when circumstances have
changed in a manner not foreseen by the settlor and such circumstances neces-
sitate the deviation.13 Although the cy pres and the deviation doctrines are some-
times confused,14 there is a clear distinction between them, and both are part of
California law.' 5
The cy pres doctrine, applicable only to charitable trusts,16 has as an essential
condition for its application that a sufficient general charitable intent on the part
of the settlor be found, an intent broader in its scope than the particular purpose
for which the trust was created. Absent such intent, the cy pres doctrine may not
be used to save the trust when the specific purpose fails.
17
If the requisite general charitable intent is found, it may be broad enough to
permit a substituted trustee as well as substituted beneficiaries. For example, in
one case large funds had been left in trust to the City of Philadelphia to admin-
ister a college for white persons. After determining that the city could no longer
constitutionally act as trustee subject to that condition, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court directed the funds be turned over by the city to a group of private indi-
viduals who could so administer the college.' 8 And in a recent California case,
where testators named beneficiary, Alcoholics Anonymous, refused to accept a
bequest in a will evidencing an intent to create a charitable trust, the court in-
yoked ey pres and appointed a trustee to carry out what it found to be a general
purpose to aid alcoholics with the funds so bequeathed.19 On the other hand, the
settlor may have manifested his wishes in such definite terms as to require that
the trust continue to be administered by the same trustee but permit the court
to apply the property for the benefit of a new cestui.20
11 BESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTs § 399 (1957).
124 Sco-r, TRUSTS § 399 (2d ed. 1956).
13IlSTATm.i=eN (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 381 (1957); 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 381 (2d
ed. 1956).
'4 15 Am. JuR. 2d Charities § 132 (1964).
15Estate of Loring, 29 Cal. 2d 423, 175 P.2d 524 (1946).
164 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 399 (2d ed. 1956).
17Compare O'Hara v. Grand Lodge I.O.G.T., 213 Cal. 131, 2 P.2d 21 (1931)
with Estate of Zilke, 115 Cal. App. 63, 1 P.2d 475 (1931) and Rohlff v. German Old
People's Home, 143 Neb. 636, 10 N.W.2d 686 (1943).
18 In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958). An elo-
quent and painstaking dissent by Musmanno, J., apparently failed to convince the
Supreme Court of the United States-an appeal was dismissed without comment in
357 U.S. 570 (1958).
19 Estate of Faulkner, 128 Cal. App. 2d 575, 275 P.2d 818 (1954). But see Bacon
Memorial Home v. Bracken, 21 Conn. Supp. 217, 152 A.2d 518 (Super. Ct. 1959).
It is axiomatic, of course, that a trust will never be allowed to fail for want of a
trustee in the absence of a clear expression to that effect by the settlor. 4 ScoTT,
TRUSTS § 397 (2d ed. 1956).
20 Thatcher v. Lewis, 335 Mo. 1130, 76 S.W.2d 677 (1934).
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2. The Deviation Doctrine-A Modification in the Method of Administration
of the Trust Under Changed Circumstances
Even where the settlor's intent permits no substitution of beneficiary or char-
itable purpose, the court, to avoid a total failure of the trust, may nevertheless
invoke the deviation power to provide for a more practical administration of the
trust for -the named beneficiaries or purposes. This power is not limited to char-
itable trusts, but is one of the equity courts' general powers of trust administra-
tion.21 Thus, in a California case where the trust fund was so diminished that it
was no longer sufficient -to carry out settlor's intent to erect a hospital of a stated
cost, cy pres was denied in the absence of a showing of a general charitable intent,
but the court nevertheless invoked the power of deviation to execute the trust by
authorizing erection of a smaller hospital, -thus preventing a failure of the trust.22
An Ohio case, a bequest in trust for the "full orphans of the United Lutheran
Church of Miami County, Ohio," held that this was too specific to permit the
application of cy pres, but that the trustee's prayer for general equitable relief
was sufficient to permit the court to order a deviation as to the administration of
the fund so as to conform in substance with the settloer's intention.23 And in an-
other California case, the court permitted the sale of land that had been given
in trust for an orphanage, where the use of the orphanage over the years had so
declined as -to make it impracticable to continue to operate it. The court approved
a plan to apply the proceeds of such sale for the benefit of a different orphanage
in an adjoining county.24 A variation of this approach is sometimes seen where a
court deems a condition to be subsidiary to what it finds to be the overriding
charitable purpose of the trust and ignores the condition. So, in an English case,
where settlor left funds in trust for a named church on condition that the minister
wear black during the services and the church was unwilling to comply with this
condition, it was held it was not necessary that it do so. 25 Similarly, in a 1961
case, the New Jersey Supreme Court, confronted with a bequest to a college in
214 ScoTt, TRusTs § 381 (2d ed. 1956).
22Estate of Loring, 29 Cal. 2d 423, 175 P.2d 524 (1946).
23 Craft v. Shroyer, 81 Ohio App. 253, 74 N.E.2d 589 (1947).
24 O'Hara v. Grand Lodge I.O.G.T., 213 Cal. 131, 2 P.2d 21 (1931). This case
illustrates how close and academic the relationship between cy pres and deviation may
become. Depending on what is determined to be the charitable purpose, the case may
stand as an example of cy pres or of deviation. If the charitable purpose of the trust
is to benefit the particular orphanage which is now defunct, applying the funds for
the benefit of an entirely different orphanage is a case of cy pres. On the other hand,
if the charitable purpose of the trust is found to be generally to benefit orphans, then
the transfer of the funds to a different orphanage is simply a modification in the ad-
ministration of the trust and is a case of the court applying its power to deviate from
the terms of the trust in changed circumstances unforeseen by the settlor when he
selected the original orphanage as the trustee.25 1n re Robinson, [1923] 2 Ch. 332. The English courts have apparently felt it
desirable to exercise rather broader powers in this type of case in recent years than
the American courts. 4 ScoTT, TRusTs § 399.4 (2d ed. 1956). In 1960 Parliament
adopted the Charities Act, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 58, § 13, which provides, inter alia, that
application cy pres shall be allowed where the original purposes have "ceased in any
other way to provide a suitable and effective method of using the property available
by virtue of the gift, regard being had to the spirit of the gift."
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trust for "protestant, gentile boys of good moral repute," held that the lower court
had properly turned the funds over to the college even though the charter of the
college made it impossible for it to accept the bequest with those conditions.2 6
This case has been criticized as an improper application of cy pres in that the
court frustrates the clear intent of the settlor, and it has been suggested that a
better result could have been reached by invoking the deviation power to place
the funds in trust in the hands of an institution which was capable of carrying
out the settloer's intent.27 On the other hand, where there was a residuary bequest
to the City of Detroit for a playground for white children, and a Michigan anti-
discrimination statute made it impossible for the city to accept the gift, the Mich-
igan Supreme Court found settloer's intent to be so narrowly circumscribed as to
preclude application of either cy pres or deviation and held that the trust failed.28
Applying These Doctrines to the Holt Situation
It should be noted in passing that a trustee never has discretion to apply a
trust cy pres or to deviate from its terms in changed circumstances without mak-
ing due application to -the proper court.2 9 In doing so, the trustee bears a heavy
burden of proving a real need for such action.30 But assuming for the sake of dis-
cussion that such a need can be proved-assuming in the Holt situation that the
evolution of the practice of medicine in California may have brought about a
condition wherein COPS under its old method of operation faces the bleak pros-
pect of dwindling attendance and a diminishing demand for the services of its
graduates3 1-- what may the court do to remedy the situation?
It will be seen from the foregoing discussion that the court may invoke the cy
pres doctrine and permit the present trustee (doing business as of this writing as
the California College of Medicine32 ) to continue to administer the trust, but as
a regular, or allopathic, school of medicine, rather than one devoted to osteopathy.
On the other hand, if it determines that the charitable intent of the donors permits
26Howard Savings Institute v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1981).
27 Note, 36 Tu-L. L. ltv. 176 (1961). Again an illustration of the semantic prob-
lems in this area. Since the court determined the overriding charitable purpose of the
donor was to benefit the college, it did not need to, and did not in this case, invoke
cy pres; it merely ordered a deviation by eliminating what it deemed to be a sub-
sidiary detail, unimportant to the testator.
28La Fond v. City of Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530 (1959). Note, 59
MiCyr. L. 1Ev. 651 (1961) expressed approval of the result, agreeing that the con-
clusion is unavoidable that the primary intent of the testator was to have a playfield
for white children only. Remedial legislation was proposed.
29 BESTATEMENT (SEcoND), ThusTs § 399, comment e (1957).
30 See In re McDonough Trust, 252 Iowa 870, 109 N.W.2d 29 (1961).
31 The American Osteopathic Association apparently fears just such a debilitating
effect on their profession in any case where there is action similar to the agreement
between the California Osteopathic Association and the California Medical Association,
and it is energetically resisting the trend. E.g., Journal of the American Osteopathic
Association, Sept., 1964, p. 8, and Nov., 1964, p. 9. For a discussion of the effects of
that agreement and the subsequent legislation in California which gives credence to
the American Osteopathic Association's feelings of alarm, see Osteopathic Physicians &
Surgeons v. California Medical Ass'n., 224 Cal. App. 2d 378, 36 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1964).
32 Editorial, Time for Unification, California Medicine, July, 1962.
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no such latitude in the purposes for which the funds are to be used, it may still
find that the exigencies of the situation require a deviation and direct that the
fund be transferred in trust to a different institution, perhaps outside of Califor-
nia, which can more practically administer the trust for the benefit of the profes-
sion of osteopathy. The court may, of course, require that the institution presently
actifig as trustee abandon its newly-undertaken program and resume the teaching
of osteopathy, despite the arguments favoring a change of some sort.
An Important Inquiry: The Donors' Intent
Ultimately, the decision as to which of these alternatives the court should
take will depend to a great extent upon what it finds to be the intent with which
these trust funds were contributed, the purposes that the donors contemplated in
giving them. This in turn raises the question of where the court is to look for
evidence regarding this intent.33
COPS has been in existence for over fifty years and in that time has doubt-
less received many separate contributions from many different sources, some
solicited, some unsolicited, some in writing by deed or bequest, others not in
writing, some with conditions, some without. The difficulty in determining a
charitable intent applicable to all these donors is apparent.
The articles of incorporation of COPS state its charitable purposes to be:
To establish, maintain, carry on and conduct an osteopathic medical and
surgical college, in which all branches of learning, and instruction which now per-
tain or which may in the future pertain to the science and art of health mainte-
nance; prevention, relief and recovery from disease, as well as any or all academic
subjects desirable or necessary as a foundation for the teaching of such branches.3 4
In weighing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court in Holt suggested that
these articles, combined with the conduct of the College over the years and rep-
resentations made in solicitation of contributions, define and fix the charitable
purpose of the institution as "primarily to conduct a college of osteopathy for the
training of osteopathic physicians and surgeons and for the general furtherance
of the profession of osteopathy."3 5 And whether or not the articles by themselves
require such a limited interpretation, the findings on trial as to the other factors
considered by the court may well bear out the court's suggestion. At any rate,
some such sort of analysis would appear to be the only practical way of deter-
mining the charitable purpose for which the trust funds have been given.36
The general rule is that neither cy pres nor deviation will be permitted where
the donor has not expressed his charitable intention generally, but has established
the trust for a specific purpose and with a specific trustee.37 Nevertheless, in de-
3 The Holt opinion suggests, 61 Cal. 2d at 758, 394 P.2d at 938, 40 Cal. Rptr.
at 250, that a substantial contributor to COPS through the years has been the American
Osteopathic Association. The intent of this particular donor may perhaps be more
readily ascertainable upon trial of this case than that of most other contributors. See
note 31 supra.
3 4 Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 757, 394
P.2d 932, 937, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 249 (1964).
s5 Id. at 759, 394 .P.2d at 938, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
36 See generally 15 Am. Jur. 2d Charities § 136 (1964).
7Estate of Black, 211 Cal. App. 2d 75, 27 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1962); Estate of
Zilke, 115 Cal. App. 63, 1 P.2d 475 (1931).
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termining whether a general charitable intent has been expressed, the construc-
tion is always most strong against the trustor.38 The bases for this rule are the
presumption that the donor did not intend for the -trust to fail" and the interest
in avoiding injury to the innocent beneficiaries. 40 Furthermore, the search for the
requisite general charitable intent will be more vigorous where there is a subse-
quent failure of a formerly valid and subsisting charitable use41 than where the
trust purpose was void ab initio.42 As applied to the Holt case, these rules would
seem to indicate that if the continued operation of the College as an osteopathic
institution is found to be impracticable, the facts should be interpreted if possible
to discern a sufficient general charitable intent on the part of the donors to permit
the application of the funds to some other purpose under the cy pres doctrine.
Conclusion: Some Policy Considerations
Finally, there are questions of public policy. Is -there a California interest in
conserving, in California, a well-endowed medical facility turning out doctors who
can practice their profession in California in harmony with the clearly expressed
consensus of both the public and the members of the medical profession? And
if so, what weight is such an interest to be given when balanced against the in-
terest in maintaining the trust for the particular purposes which donors over the
last half-century have contemplated in contributing to this institution?
It may be observed that courts in recent years have had recourse to cy pres
and similar rules with increasing frequency and liberality of application, gener-
ally as a means of effecting the courts' notions of social utility.43 Whether cy pres
will be applicable in Holt must await the outcome of the trial.
Charles A. Brigham*
S8 O'Hara v. Grand Lodge I.O.G.T., 213 Cal. 131, 2 P.2d 21 (1931).
39 Ibid.40 See George W. Donaghey Foundation v. Little Rock Univ., 231 Ark. 748, 332
S.W.2d 497 (1960).41 Union Methodist Episcopal Church v. Equitable Trust Co., 32 Del. Ch. 197,
83 A.2d 111 (1951); Powers v. Home for Aged Women, 58 R.I. 323, 192 AUt. 770
(1937); BESTATEMNT (SEcoND), ThusTs § 399, comment i (1957).
42Estate of Black, 211 Cal. App. 2d 75, 27 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1962).
43 E.g., Howard Savings Institute v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1961); see
generally the valuable article by Edith Fisch, Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44
CoRNELL L.Q. 382 (1959).
*Member, Third Year Class.
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